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Abst rac t : This paper seeks to summarize the literature on the 
rationale for firms as essential adjunct organizations for allocating 
resources. It also sets out a critique of attempts to negate the idea 
that a capitalist firm is necessarily an authority structure and 
involves the subordination of workers to capitalists. In the 
process it also advances the idea that workers, close collaborators 
of firms as well as shareholders and managers should be regarded 
as stakeholders in a firm. One corollary of this idea is that 
permitting an unregulated market for corporate control to operate 
has little justification in theory, and that alternatives to the Anglo-
Saxon model of corporate control must be seriously constructed. 
Finally, the paper also argues that a long-established firm has 
history and path-dependence built into its structure and 
functioning, and game theory can at best illuminate particular 
corners and aspects of the working of firms. 
1. Introduction 
1 start with what I take to be a self-evident proposition, 
namely, that there is no mainstream economic theory of the 
structure, function, reproduction, growth or transformation of 
economic organizations. It will take too long to enumerate the 
requirements of such a theory. In any case, I hope to make out 
a plausible case for claiming that such an economic theory can be 
constructed only by abstracting from many crucial aspects of the 
structure, function and reproduction of economic organizations 
and therefore is likely to be not only useless for most purposes 
but also positively misleading if we want to use it for description 
or prescription. 
In order to clarify the kind of assumptions that 
mainstream economics makes when its practitioners go about 
practising "normal science' in Kuhn's sense (Kuhn, 1970), it will 
be useful to give an example of what I regard as a relatively 
successful branch of economic theory. The theory I have in mind 
is that of consumer behaviour. Under standard mainstream theory 
assumptions, a consumer is endowed with a utility function or a 
well-behaved field of preference orderings. She then sets about 
maximizing her utility or getting to the most preferred 
consumption bundle subject to the budget constraint she operates 
with. In more ambitious exercises which seek to chart the 
individual's pattern of consumption over time, she is endowed 
with an intertemporal utility function, and maximizing some 
integral of utilities over time yields the desired trajectory of the 
most-preferred consumption bundles. By aggregating the 
consumption of the collection of individuals with appropriate 
weights given to income classes or consumers classified according 
to age or sex, or any other criterion which serves to differentiate 
consumers with different patterns of consumption (vegetarians and 
non-vegetarians, for example) we arrive at the total of consumer 
expenditure patterns for the collection of individuals (for a 
masterly survey of the field of consumer behaviour theory, see 
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1983). 
However, both in theory and in actual observation it is not 
the consumption decisions of all individual consumers, which are 
taken into account. Consumption surveys are carried out on the 
basis of households (some households may, of course, consist of 
single members but they are still a minority group in most 
countries). Within households, consumption expenditures are 
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made by the head of the household, or let us say, a couple, or 
stretching it further, a coalition of decision-makers in a joint 
family. So theorists have tried to construct credible social welfare 
functions for households; in doing so, they often had to sacrifice 
the assumption that decisions are made by rational individuals 
maximizing their own utility (they are rational in the prior sense 
that they have well-ordered preferences for all possible choice 
situations - an assumption which has been found to be violated in 
experiments conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1974/1978) 
and other social scientists). 
However, even if we accept that there is a theory of the 
household's behaviour as a consumer, there is as yet no economic 
theory of the household as a producer and a reproducer of itself. 
Stigler and Becker (1977) have advanced a theoiy of production 
of nonmarketed household goods and services, and Becker (1991) 
has produced an ambitious, grand theory of household size, 
household behaviour, and human fertility. As for the effort of 
Stigler and Becker to theorize the use of leisure time and 
preference for particular goods or serv ices (such as drugs or 
music) by household members, the comment of Deaton and 
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Mucllbauer (1983, pp.243-4) is worth quoting : Our only qualm 
is that, when the intervening variables are not observable, there 
may be little cutting edge to the distinction between preferences 
and constraints, and the "explanation" offered by the approach can 
sometimes be complicated ways of making rather simple points'. 
Becker's theory of the family is not easily dismissed. But 
its basic assumptions make it rather a dubious candidate for being 
the foundational theory of family behaviour or reproduction in a 
typical less developed country. By and large, the participants are 
all determinedly 'rational 1, free individuals operating in markets 
which have few nonmarket constraints. Class distinctions and 
built-in inequalities between men and women, adults and children 
are either assumed away or are taken as part of the data. Such a 
theory, for all its remarkable conceptual clarity, can have little 
appeal as a framework for building up even a "thick description' 
(a phrase coined by Clifford Geertz) of economic organizations 
in India, let alone anything resembling a theory with real 
explanatory power. By and large, the basic assumptions of 
Becker's theory bind it down to the functioning of white, 
American, transient, nuclear families. 
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Households are producers in almost every cultural 
milieu. Unpaid housework produces cups of tea, meals for the 
family, cupboards for clothes, shelves for books, or in more 
privileged families, supervision in the kitchen or in the garden, 
and so on. The extension of such work into the market produces 
self-employment or when there is an outside employer putting out 
the work to the household, paid employment in the socalled 
informal sector. As the employment of child labour under the 
control of their guardians or the differences in the formation or 
subdivision of families of agricultural labourers and of substantial 
landowners illustrate (see e.g. Krishnaji, 1980/1992), the 
production activities of household members and their patterns of 
reproduction are intimately related. As far as I am aware, no 
economist has as yet produced a plausible theory with postulates 
of individual maximization for explaining the functioning of 
households as producers and their biological and social 
reproduction. 
A large number of economists have attempted to explain 
the structure and functioning of business firms, or more narrowly, 
capitalist firms in which the owners or controllers of capital and 
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the workers are clearly distinguished. However, most of these 
developments have occurred since the 1930s, in which the work 
of R.H. Coase, Herbert Simon, and Oliver Williamson have 
played a key role. But beginnings of conceptualization of the 
functioning of capitalist firms can be traced back to Adam Smith 
and Karl Marx. We will have occasion to refer to the work of 
Marx because he was the first social scientist to point to a key 
distinction between a capitalist firm and the market in which it 
operates. 
2. Conceptualization of the capitalist firm : Coase, 
Marx, Simon and beyond 
Most of the analysts of the modern business firm start 
from two key questions asked by Coase in his 1937 paper (Coase, 
1937). These questions are : why should there be a firm 
employing labour or investing other people's capital for a 
reasonably long period rather than just markets in which 
commodities and services, including labour power and credit, are 
bought and sold in arm's-length transactions like potatoes, fish or 
nee, in daily markets, daily or hourly labour exchanges and in 
moneylenders' shops ? The second question is, if, under certain 
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conditions firms are more efficient devices for allocating 
resources than markets, why is there not a single firm covering all 
allocation decisions throughout a country, or for that matter, 
throughout the world? 
The great virtue of Coase's article was to pose these two 
questions simultaneously and in a stark manner. The first of these 
questions had been asked and answered by Marx (1887/n.d.. 
chapters 13 and 14) : a capitalist firm is there because a great 
number of workers working together under the direction of a 
capitalist are more productive than the same number of workers 
labouring separately. It was Marx who saw that the controller of 
capital was also the coordinator in a firm. He used an apt 
military analogy (some of the military establishments of Europe 
turning out armaments were among the first modern factories) to 
bring out the authority relation in a firm : 'By the co-operation of 
numerous wage-labourers, the sway of capital develops into a 
requisite for carrying on the labour-process itself, into a real 
requisite of production. That a capitalist should command in the 
field of production is now as indispensable as that, a general 
should command on the field of battle' (Marx 1887/n.d., p.330). 
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The second question of Coase had been asked, as Coase 
acknowledged, by Austin Robinson (1934) and Nicholas Kaldor 
(1934) among others, who pointed by and large to limits on 
managerial ability as determinants of the maximum size a firm 
can grow into at any given moment of time. 
Coase simply accepted that the owner-manager of the firm 
will exercise authority over the employees and then enquired in 
detail into the costs that limit the size of the firm. These costs 
are those of use of the market or short-term contracts rather than 
of planned allocation of resources and tasks within the firm. 
These costs, designated 'transaction costs', became then the 
domain of analysis of a number of economists, of whom Oliver 
Williamson can claim to have made the greatest contribution to 
this strand of the literature (Williamson, 1975, 1985). The 
concept of transaction costs allowed the economists' tools to be 
brought into play. At every point where the manager faces the 
choice of using the price mechanism or short-term contracts rather 
than internalizing the supply within the firm and entering into 
long-term contracts with those who would accept the authority of 
the manager, he decides on the least-cost method of going about 
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his business, and that set of decisions determines the boundaries 
of the firm. 
Coase also pointed out that many transactions required for 
production or sale by a firm are long-term in nature, and 
necessarily involve considerable uncertainty. One way of 
eliminating delays and uncertainty was to incorporate these 
transactions within the purview of the jurisdiction of the firm. 
Later students such as Hymer (1960/1976), Williamson (1975, 
1985) and Goldberg (1980) have stressed that many firms possess 
idiosyncratic assets, and firm-specific ways of learning and 
knowledge accumulation and are involved in contracts which 
presuppose a relation which is not mediated by arm's-length 
market transactions; it is only an organization such as the firm 
that would allow the full value of these assets or learning 
processes to be realized at any moment of time, and accumulated 
at a satisfactory rate over time. Thus transaction costs, the 
necessarily incomplete nature of all contracts, the necessity of 
minimizing opportunism in post-contract or post-investment 
situations (where one of the parties may find it profitable to go 
back on his word or commitment), and the best way of realizing 
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the short-terra and long-term values of idiosyncratic assets and 
learning have all been adduced as the raison d 'e t re of a firm 
rather than the market as the best allocational organization under 
a wide range of circumstances. 
In a contribution which was ignored in the literature for 
a long time, Simon (1951/1982) tried to formalize the necessity 
of the authority relation by using the device of satisfaction 
functions of the boss or the manager, and the worker, and asking 
under what conditions the employee would be prepared to accept 
the authority of the boss to order him about, and the boss would 
find it profitable to employ him. Simon's answer was roughly 
that the boss or employer would take on the worker when he is 
uncertain about the exact nature and timing of the tasks he might 
want the employee to perform, and his expected profit exceeds 
the cost of the wage to be paid under the expected probability 
distribution of tasks. Conversely, the worker would accept the job 
when his expected satisfaction (roughly the wage minus the 
degree of unpleasantness of the work) exceeds or equals the net 
satisfaction he can enjoy in his best alternative avocation. 
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It is interesting that Simon had a background in the theory 
of administrative behaviour, and should have realized that the 
rationale of the firm could not be grounded without providing the 
raison d'etre of the boss-worker relationship. It is also 
interesting to note that Simon made two remarks almost 
incidentally, which many theorists of firm behaviour continue to 
ignore. He cautioned, first, that his construct was a model of 
hypothetically rational behaviour in an area where institutional 
history' and other nonrational elements are notoriously important' 
(Simon 1951/1982, p.20). The second was his observation that ' if 
the worker had confidence that the employer would take account 
of his satisfactions, the former would presumably be willing to 
work for a smaller wage than if he thought these satisfactions 
were going to be ignored in the employer's exercise of authority 
and only profitability to the employer would be taken into 
account' (Ibid.). The possible importance of ' job satisfaction' on 
the part of the employee, and some degree of overlap between his 
utility and the utility of his boss in an appropriately designed firm 
architecture have been admitted, if at all, by economists as 
variables or functions to be manipulated in designing incentive 
mechanisms that maximize the current value of the firm. 
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3. Attempts to gouge out the authority content from 
the firm and reduce it to a market-like entity 
The idea that at the core of the firm there is an authority 
relation obviously disturbed a number of economists since that 
seemed to be a barrier that a mere maximization calculus could 
not surmount or dissolve. I will discuss three different attempts 
which have attracted attention in the literature (they are all 
anthologized by Putterman 1986, and discussed in detail by Hay 
and Morris, 1991). The first attempt is that of Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), who would reduce the firm simply to a team 
without any locus of superior authority. They write : 
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power 
to settle issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary 
action superior to that available in the conventional 
market. This is delusion. The firm does not own all its 
inputs. It has no power of fiat, no authority, no 
disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree 
from ordinary market contracting between any two parties 
... wherein ... is the relationship between a grocer and his 
employee different from that between a grocer and his 
customers ? It is in a team use of inputs and a 
centralized position of some party in the contractual 
arrangements of all other inputs. It is the centralized 
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contractual agent in a team product ive process - not 
some superior authoritarian or disciplinary power 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972/1986, pp.111-2). 
In their article, Alchian and Demsetz practise a sleight of 
hand, or if you like, a discursive displacement, at two critical 
points. One is that they simply change the question of who 
exercises authority within the firm to that of whether the firm 
exercises any authority which is qualitatively different from that 
exercised by any other agent. That the firm exercises that kind 
of qualitatively superior authority is a claim, that to my 
knowledge, was not advanced by any serious theorist of the firm. 
The second point at which they practise a sleight of hand is in 
answering the question as to why it is the grocer rather than his 
employees who acts as the centralized contractual agent' in the 
team. Their answer is that the grocer rather than the employee 
acts as the residual claimant to the proceeds of teamwork. The 
question as to why the grocer is the residual claimant is 
essentially answered by Alchian and Demsetz in terms of risk-
bearing by the grocer. As we shall see, the question of who 
exercises authority in the firm is tied up with the issue of who 
gets the profit made by the firm, and the descriptive and the 
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prescriptive become inextricably tied up. We shall argue that all 
owners of factors of production working for the firm and not just 
the owners of capital are risk-bearers and therefore, to say that the 
grocer alone is the risk-bearer and therefore is the recipient of 
profit begs the answer. 
Another attempt to divest the firm of an authority relation 
was made by Fama (1980/1986). His avowed aim was to carry 
forward the analysis of a firm as a team. He explicitly takes as his 
model a joint-stock company, in which equity is owned by one 
set of persons and the management is vested in another set of 
persons who will not generally fully coincide with the first. In 
his own words : 
The main thesis of this paper is that separation of security 
ownership and control can be explained as an efficient 
form of economic organization within the set of 
contracts' perspective. We set aside the typical 
presumption that a corporation has owners in any 
meaningful sense. The attractive concept of the 
entrepreneur is also laid to rest at least for the purposes 
of the large modern corporation. Instead, the two 
functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur, 
management and risk-bearing, are treated as naturally 
separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. 
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The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, 
which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently 
monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its 
individual members. In addition, individual participants 
in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the 
discipline and opportunities provided by the market for 
their services, both within, and outside of the firm (Fama, 
1980/1986, p.197). 
Let me first note that Fama, shares the tendency towards 
amnesia of the average modern economist, and seems to be 
unaware that in trying to decide between pure Schumpeterian 
entreprcneurship and risk-bearing as the locus of the residual 
claimant, and associating risk-bearing only with the owners of 
capital, he is reproducing the ideologically fraught debates of the 
1930s between the followers of Schumpeter and Knight. In none 
of the papers I have cited so far, there is a recognition that 
workers also are risk-bearers and that their exposure to risk in the 
case of a failing firm is in some senses greater than for the 
owners of equity or the managers of the firm. (Among 
mainstream economists, surprisingly enough, Harrod (1952) seems 
to have been one of the few to have made this point). 
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A parallel attempt to decentre the concept of the firm 
developed through providing a justification for a virtually 
unregulated market for corporate control. Takeovers of joint-stock 
companies had been seen by Marris (1964), Manne (1965) and 
other economists and lawyers as providing an ultimate device for 
monitoring and disciplining managers. The argument was now 
made that a competitive market for firms would always be able 
to find out the true value of the components making up a firm, 
and would provide a natural selection process for singling out not 
only inefficient managers but also inefficient structures of firms. 
The arguments in this area have often resembled those used to 
establish the Modigliani - Miller style theorems to argue the case 
for the irrelevance of capital structures of joint-stock firms in a 
truly competitive market for capital (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958). Since a competitive capital market will 'discover' the true 
value of the components of a firm and its value when they are put 
together in a particular design of exercise of authority, monitoring 
mechanisms, and incentive systems, the need for separate 
discussion of the issue of who exercises authority in a firm 
virtually disappears. However, the recognition of informational 
inadequacies of capital markets and the empirical finding that 
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U.S. firms do care about whether their capital expenditures are 
financed by debt or equity have badly damaged the credibility of 
the Modigliani-Miller hypothesis (see Greenwald, Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1984; Mackie-Mason, 1990). 
4. Asset specificity, historicity, and relational exchange as 
a rationale for the existence of firms 
Heated debates have been carried on in the Anglo-Saxon 
literature on the efficiency of the take-over mechanism in 
practice, ways of improving it and preventing its abuse, and 
various codes and regulatory devices have been evolved to 
minimize the chances of takeovers that damage the interests of 
shareholders in general, and in some countries, of minority 
shareholders, and even of workers. At this point I am not 
concerned with these issues, which are undoubtedly important in 
finding out how a market for corporate control, if it is allowed to 
come into existence, can perform the task of protecting 
stakeholder interests. At this point I would like to bring out 
certain basic assumptions made by analysts who would put their 
faith in the market for corporate control as the final arbiter of the 
fate of firms. 
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The first such assumption is that the capital market can 
not only discover the true present value of a firm but can ensure 
that the takeover payments are made in accordance with that 
value. However, even with transparent accountancy and auditing 
methods, it is very difficult to get at the true present value of a 
large firm with many divisions and many products as its domain 
of operation. Problems of asymmetric and incomplete 
information foul up the process of arriving at a precise measure. 
Moreover, the capital market is a notoriously imperfectly 
competitive mechanism, in which bubbles, share-pushing, insider 
trading and bear interests can play havoc with attempts to judge 
the true value of a firm. Finally, the managers of financial funds 
can have the same incentive problems as managers of other firms. 
(For an empirical investigation, see Lazonick, 1992; for a 
summary of theoretical underpinnings see Gertler, 1988). 
Apart from problems with the functioning of capital 
markets, there are other obstacles against the attempt to establish 
the true value of a firm, especially if a takeover is expected to 
lead to a change in the personnel of managers or other key 
personnel, or even the management style of the firm. One of the 
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major reasons advanced in the theory of the firm, of both the 
domestic and multinational variety, has been that firms have 
idiosyncratic assets, including human capital, and that a free-
wheeling market would be unable to establish or bring out the 
tme productive potential of such assets. Economists have also 
increasingly realized the importance of learning within a firm (cf. 
the Horndahl effect cited by Arrow, 1962). Thus there is a 
historicity in the behaviour of good firms, as, of course, there is 
in the functioning of bad firms. But there is historicity also in the 
environment that firms work in. 
This alerts us to the fact that most theorists of firms have 
ignored the many linkages between firms and other economic, 
social and political organizations with which they are linked (c f. 
Richardson, 1972). Firms do not only compete with one another, 
they also collaborate, and firms might compete in one field and 
collaborate in others. This enormous area has been captured only 
through some empirical studies of subcontracting, industrial 
clusters, and industrial districts, and of strategic behaviour of big 
or innovative firms. As even a cursoiy study of these phenomena 
will reveal, it is impossible to have a purely economic theory in 
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the sense indicated earlier, of such economic organizations as 
well. 
In a new introduction (1995) to her pioneering work on 
the theory of growth and strategic behaviour of firms, Edith 
Penrose (1959/1995) writes : "One of the primary assumptions of 
the theory of growth of firms is that history "matters"; growth is 
essentially an evolutionary process and based on the cumulative 
growth of collective knowledge, in the context of a purposive 
firm'. If we recognize this, we can see that history also matters 
in conceptualizing the structure of firms. If workers acquire 
specialized, idiosyncratic knowledge by working in a firm and 
thereby render it more productive, then workers also bccome 
value-adding stakeholders in a firm. 
In recent years, many other economists have recognized 
the hysteresis inherent in many economic decisions and structures. 
Since no major investments can be 'reversed' or undone without 
incurring substantial costs, and since investments of one kind or 
another are at the heart of economic growth, irreversibility and 
path-dependence emerge in many historical processes (see in this 
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connection, Arthur, 1989, and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
The reservations we have sketched about relying on the 
stock market alone, or principally, for disciplining the managers 
of a firm, and about regarding the owners of equity as the only 
stakeholders in a firm have been reflected in devising governance 
structures in which there are other disciplining devices than the 
stock market and in which workers are given a voice in running 
the firm and in strategic decisions that affect their own future. 
Such governance structures are to be found in Japan and 
Germany. Even in Britain, the home of the ideology of regarding 
the shareholder as the king in a company, malfunctioning of 
major companies and disastrous results in several takeover bids 
have led Kay and Silberston (1995) to propose a governance 
structure for British public limited companies which is very 
different from what is observed there at the present time. 
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5. Research strategies : Game theory and/or comparative 
studies of economic organizations (including firms) in 
their historical setting 
The typical form of an economic organization in a 
capitalist society is a firm with a set of employers (a single 
person or a management board or coalition) and a set of 
employees. The most advanced form of that firm in most 
countries is a joint-stock company with widespread shareholding 
and a group of directors or managers who will normally hold only 
a fraction of the shares of the company they manage (in some 
cases, none at all). Either of these forms must have an authority-
structure under which some directives are obeyed simply because 
they have been issued by superiors, and not necessarily because 
the subordinates find it utility - maximizing to obey those 
directives at that moment. Extending this further, the structure of 
boss-subordinate relations within which directives are issued and 
obeyed, can be U-form or M-form (Chandler, Jr; 1977) or a 
typically Japanese form (which Aoki (1994) styles J-form or J-
mode). It may be governed by Anglo-Saxon-style hierarchy or 
Japanese-style polyarchy (Sah and Stiglitz, 1985). It may have a 
single board of directors, answerable to the shareholders in the 
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ultimate analysis as in the Anglo-Saxon mode of governance, or 
as in Germany, it may have two boards, a supervisory board 
meeting infrequently, and a management board responsible for 
day-to-day management. All these variations on the authority and 
governance structures of firms are the result of differing historical 
circumstances and conjunctures in different countries, and the 
Anglo-Saxon or Fama-Jensen-Meckling style of governance 
structure has no claim to be regarded superior under all 
circumstances or as the ultimate form into which all well-
functioning firms must evolve (Gilson and Roe, 1993). 
Attempts have been made by game theorists to model 
particular incentive systems on the basis of interaction of two 
players or n ( > 2 ) players in Nash non-cooperative games with 
appropriate assumptions regarding pay-offs of the players and the 
rules of the game. These exercises have yielded remarkable 
results once the contours of the basic rules of governance or firm 
structure have been laid down. In some situations, bargaining 
between players (employers and employees) can also shed light 
on the way particular aspccts of industrial relations have taken 
shape. However, bargaining behaviour is shaped by broader 
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political circumstances. The evolution of the postwar Japanese 
system of industrial relations was, for example, shaped first by the 
decision of the US occupying authorities to allow the formation 
of free trade unions and collective bargaining, and later on, their 
determination to root out communist influence on trade unions 
and the extension of their help to Japanese company managers to 
establish company-friendly enterprise unions and more or less, 
abolish industry wise unions (Armstrong, Glyn and Harrisen, 
1984). Thus the limits of bargaining have to be found in actual 
events and major conjunctures in history as well as the customary 
relations of particular nations, and only then can bargaining 
theory get to work. 
Turning now to game theory, with all its attractive 
features, we find that it is still unable to deal with really complex 
interactions. Moreover, game theoretic models are fraught with 
the some problems of bounded rationality and the necessarily 
incomplete nature of information in many real life situations, 
which provide the raison d'etre for the capitalist firm as islands 
of planning in a sea of impersonal (or not always so impersonal) 
markets in the first place. The implications of the limits of 
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rationality' and incompleteness of information for the strategy of 
deriving results in organizational behaviour and structure have 
been emphasized by Radner (1996) in a recent paper : 
Two issues have become increasingly apparent in 
attempts to apply the present notions of "economic 
rationality" to the theory of organisation of business 
firms. The first goes under the rubric of bounded 
rationality... I shall try to provide a more detailed 
account of bounded rationality than is usually done. In 
particular, it is important to distinguish between (1) costly 
rationality like the costs of observation, communication, 
and even computation, that require only an extension of 
the standard "Savage Paradigm", and (2) truly bounded 
rationality, like not knowing the implications of 
even-thing that one knows, which goes far beyond the 
Savage paradigm. 
The second issue, which I shall call 
indeterminacy, arises in attempts to apply the theory of 
strategic games to models of organisations, namely, one 
often faces a very large multiplicity of solutions, which 
significantly weakens or even destroys the predictive 
power of the theory. By "solution" I mean here the so-
called non-cooperative equilibrium, usually associated 
with the names of Auguste Cournot and John Nash (and 
extended and refined by John Harsanyi. Reinhard Selten 
and others to cover games in which the players have 
incomplete information) (Radner, 1996, pp.1360-1). 
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To illustrate his point about indeterminacy, Radner 
provides an analysis of the usual sealed-bid mechanism for 
arriving at the contract price in situations where the buyer and 
seller have only an incomplete information about the cost and 
value of the commodity or service concerned to each other. While 
theoretical solutions to problems in the presence of truly bounded 
rationality' or indeterminacy of equilibria are fragile or absent 
altogether, in real life, conventions, accepted rules of the game, 
social or organizational devices for damage limitation, and so on 
decide the actual outcome. One major objective of research in 
these areas would be to find out the conventions, social and 
political constraints, the nature of legal delimitation of rules of the 
game and so on as a way of understanding the structure, 
functioning, reproduction and transformation of economic 
organizations. This would be an exercise in 'contextual social 
science' (Bagchi, 1996) and would draw upon the resources of all 
the relevant social science disciplines. 
It would be tempting to see evolutionary game theory' as 
a framework for understanding the evolution of the social norms 
and conventions. While exercises in this branch of game theory 
26 
can yield interesting results (Weibull, 1995), the narrowness and 
fragility of the solutions are even more apparent in this area of 
research. The tracking of evolution of common knowledge', 
trust, or shared notions of rules of the game depends on the 
author's prior, often arbitrary-looking assumptions about what the 
players believe in. Biology has provided the notion of 
'evolutionary stable strategies' (the pioneering work in this area 
is Maynard Smith, 1982). Evolutionary game theory with 
applications in social science has grown in analogy with 
biological evolutionary game theory. However, as Maynard Smith 
(1995) has pointed out, there is nothing corresponding to genes, 
or Mendelian laws of genetic reproduction in the patterns of 
human thinking or behaviour. Dawkins (1976) had coined the 
terms 'raemes' and memetics', as units of human ideas and the 
dynamics of those ideas, but they remain virtually empty 
constructs since we do not have the basic laws of 'memetics' 
(Maynard Smith. 1995; and Borgers, 1996). 
Thus while evolutionary game theory will continue to 
yield interesting results for models of relatively simple interactive 
behaviour of individuals and firms, for credible insights into 
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actual firm structures and behaviour, we must look towards 
comparative and historical studies. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Practically all the issues raised in this paper have been 
raised by other analysts. Adherents of the proposition that 
contracts between persons extending over any period of time and 
involving costly or irreversible investments in the real world of 
uncertainty must necessarily be incomplete have then advanced it 
as reasons for vertical integration and organization of non-market 
allocation mechanisms in the first place (Williamson. 1975; Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian 1978/1986). They have gone on to 
theorize the necessity of a decision-maker in such situations and 
have analysed the reasons why in a corporate organization the 
monitoring and decision-making functions are exercised by 
managers who may or may not be owners of capital (Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1989: see also Hart, 1993). Much of their discourse 
in this regard, as we have pointed out earlier, parallels the debates 
of the nineteen thirties about the locus of profit-earning in a 
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business enterprise (for representative examples of this literature, 
see Knight, 1934/1950 and Gordon, 1936/1950). Economists 
have produced a number of models showing how particular social 
institutions can foster skills and raise efficiency wages when they 
act as mechanisms for correcting market failures. Internal labour 
markets of firms and networks of connected firms can be such 
enabling institutions (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986; Booth and 
Snower, 1996). But these different strands of analysis have 
remained isolated from one another. It is necessary to connect 
them together to at least provide a thick description of an 
enterprise system, of which the theory of the corporate enterprise 
will be only a part. Such a theory has also to be historically 
grounded because as we have argued, firm structures and their 
relations with the rest of society are fundamentally influenced by 
the internal histories of firms and related institutions and by 
external shocks or conjunctures affecting the particular society 
concerned. 
Finally, I would like to sketch the relation of our analysis 
to some of the areas of discussion which have directly impinged 
on our views about how institutions and learning processes are 
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put in place and evolve. First of all, there is the corpus of work 
which has gained currency as the new institutional economics. 
From what we have said above, it would follow that the structure 
of economic institutions would be shaped not only by 
considerations of minimizing transaction costs or incentive 
conflicts between principals and agents but also by norms and 
rules of behaviour in a particular society and the loci of power in 
households, firms, property right-holders, and the state (for an 
insightful discussion of the new institutional economics and 
references to the literature, see Vromen, 1995; for a broader 
canvas of theories of development in which states, markets and 
societies interact in different ways, see Martinussen, 1997). 
Secondly, attempts to derive the evolution of institutions purely 
on the basis of strategic interactions betweeen individuals or 
coalitions of individuals can only have a limited reach at best. 
Attempts to derive the rules governing the inner workings of 
firms on the basis of their survival value a la neoclassical 
economists such as Alchian and Friedman (for references, see 
Vromen, 1995, Chapter 2) or following the methods of Nelson 
and Winter (1982) can also have applicability only within a 
limited framework, and over such a long run that many of the 
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basic assumptions must be upset by other movements of history. 
But. of course, this does not mean that research into survival 
values of particular rules governing economic organizations and 
their mutual interaction is useless. Such research may be 
essential to discover those rules which are not formalized but 
which nevertheless guide the behaviour of surviving organizations 
and their modes of interaction. 
Finally, our analysis also directs our attention to the 
necessity of enquiries into learning processes within firms, within 
interfirm networks and society in general. The perspective on 
learning processes has followed broadly two mode of 
development. One might be called the Babbage-Taylor mode in 
which the division of labour is determined by the owners or 
controllers of capital, and the workers merely follow the set 
routines. All the learning takes place at the level of the managers. 
The other follows Adam Smith's mode of analysis in which the 
division of labour and learning processes evolve as the market 
expands, or conditions governing production change. Marx's 
analysis stands at the crossroads of the two, in which the capitalist 
tries to convert the worker into an animated machine, but the 
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worker's subjectivity asserts itself from time to time in class 
struggles and revolutions (for an interesting discussion of the 
contrast see Pagano, 1991). Studies of Japanese and German 
enterprises and of industrial districts in the Third Italy have 
shown that the extremist Marxist or Babbage-Tavlor views have 
to be modified, and we must also study the learning processes 
within firms and in the broader arena of economic and social 
institutions in general (see also Booth and Snower, 1996). 
Viewed against this perspective also, the Alchian-Demsetz-Jensen. 
Meckling view of the firm structure also turns out to be grossly 
inadequate as a conceptual tool. 
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